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Abstract: This paper examines the role of cooperativeness and impatience in the exploitation 
of common pool resources (CPRs) by combining laboratory experiments with field data. We 
study fishermen whose main, and often only, source of income stems from the use of fishing 
grounds with open access. The exploitation of a CPR involves a negative interpersonal and 
inter-temporal externality because individuals who exploit the CPR reduce the current and the 
future yield both for others and for themselves. Economic theory – which assumes the 
existence of general across-situational traits – thus predicts that fishermen who exhibit more 
cooperative and less impatient behavior in the laboratory should be less likely to exploit the 
CPR, which our findings confirm. We thus corroborate economic theory and extend the scope 
of other-regarding preference theories to crucial economic decisions with lasting 
consequences for the people involved. In addition, we establish cooperativeness and 
impatience as two distinct traits related to resource conservation in the field and validate 
laboratory preference measures. 
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Standard economic theory hypothesizes that there is little cooperation in sustaining common 
pool resources (CPRs) where individual and collective interests are in conflict with one 
another. The standard assumption of pure self-interest implies that natural resources like 
fishing grounds or rain forests are overexploited, and that we are often trapped in an 
inevitable process that ends in the “Tragedy of the Commons” (Hardin, 1968). An additional 
aggravating factor for resource conservation is the propensity to discount future outcomes. 
The more impatient resource users are, the more they exploit natural resources.2
In view of the key role that economic theory assigns to individuals’ preferences in the 
exploitation of CPRs, we examine whether laboratory other-regarding and time preference 
measures predict fishermen’s propensity to exploit a CPR that constitutes their main, and 
often only, source of income. This is a nontrivial task because it requires both laboratory 
preference measures and field data from the same group of fishermen. The problem is that all 
sorts of factors – such as reputational incentives, budget, or information constraints – often 
 Interestingly, 
observations from the laboratory paint a more optimistic picture with respect to cooperation in 
social dilemmas. Considerable evidence now shows that some individuals are cooperative and 
voluntarily sustain CPRs or public goods in the laboratory (Andreoni 1988, Walker, Gardner, 
Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom, Walker, Gardner, 1992; Andreoni, 1995; Ledyard, 1995; Cardenas, 
2000; Fehr and Gächter 2000 and 2002; Casari and Plott, 2003; Croson, 2007; Charness and 
Villeval, 2009), suggesting that some individuals have other-regarding preferences (Andreoni, 
1990; Rabin, 1993; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and 
Rabin, 2002; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Sobel, 2005; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; 
Segal and Sobel, 2007). There is also laboratory evidence that individuals differ with regard 
to their degree of impatience (Benzion, Rapoport, Yagil, 1989; Ashraf, Karlan, Yin, 2006). 
                                                 
2 Farzin (1984) shows that this statement holds as long as the capital requirements for exploiting natural 
resources are low. If capital requirements are high, however, impatient individuals might shy away from 
investing in technology that facilitates the exploitation of natural resources and thus be less likely to exploit 
natural resources. Capital requirements are very low in our setting.  
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confound field measures of preferences, while several factors specific to the laboratory 
environment but not present in naturally occurring situations might influence laboratory 
behavior (List, 2006). Moreover, prominent scholars have suggested that preferences are 
“constructed” and highly context-specific (e.g. Kahneman et al., 1993; Loewenstein and 
Issacharoff, 1994; Schkade and Payne, 1994; Slovic, 1995; Kahneman, 1996; Hoeffler and 
Ariely, 1999; Frederick, Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, 2002). To quote Tversky and Thaler 
(1990, p. 210): “People do not possess a set of pre-defined preferences for every contingency. 
Rather, preferences are constructed in the process of making a choice or judgment. Second, 
the context and procedures involved in making choices or judgments influence the preferences 
that are implied by the elicited responses. In practical terms, this implies that behavior is 
likely to vary across situations that economists consider identical.”3
Therefore, if we can show that laboratory measures of other-regarding and time 
preferences nevertheless significantly predict fishermen’s behavior in the field, we can kill 
several birds with one stone. First, we corroborate economic theories that predict the 
relevance of individuals’ preferences for the exploitation of CPRs. Second, we extend the 
scope of other-regarding preference theories to crucial economic decisions with lasting 
consequences for the people involved. Third, we identify two distinct traits, namely 
cooperativeness and impatience, that are related to resource conservation in the field. And 
finally, we demonstrate the value of laboratory preference measures for a better understanding 
of field behavior.  
  
We achieve these goals with the help of two unique data sets that relate individual 
laboratory behavior with the fishermen's individual decisions pertaining to the use of certain 
fishing instruments. Our study takes place in Brazil and involves shrimpers and fishermen 
                                                 
3 Beliefs in the context-dependence of preferences have been fueled by the observation of preference reversals 
across different elicitation methods. For an examination of the preference reversal phenomenon see, Plott and 
Grether (1979), for example.  
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who live off their catch from a lake. As there is free access to the lake, they face a CPR 
dilemma in their daily lives. There is suggestive evidence that fishermen in this setting differ 
in their level of cooperation for sustaining fishing grounds, i.e. they use different fishing 
instruments that allow them to influence the proportion of the catch consisting of small 
shrimp/fish which have not yet reached fertility (Cavalcanti, 2003). We have data from 
shrimpers (collected 2008) and fishermen (collected 2006), and both include information 
about the extent to which the fishermen's chosen fishing instruments exploit the CPR, as well 
as their decisions in two laboratory experiments: a public goods experiment where free-riding 
is the dominant strategy, and a time preference experiment.  
Economic theories of other-regarding preferences predict that individuals who exhibit 
a higher propensity to cooperate in the public goods experiment in the laboratory (i.e. those 
who demonstrate cooperativeness) and those who show more patience in the time preference 
experiment should use fishing instruments that are less likely to exploit the CPR for the 
following reasons: (i) a higher current exploitation reduces other fishermen's current yield. 
Thus, ceteris paribus, other-regarding fishermen will impose fewer current negative 
externalities on others; and (ii) a higher current exploitation (in terms of small shrimp/ fish 
that have not yet reached fertility) also reduces the future yield both for others and for 
themselves.4
To provide a rigorous test of whether cooperativeness and impatience are relevant in 
the field, we use laboratory preference measures that differ from the field context in important 
ways. First, the fishermen face a CPR problem in the field, while subjects play a public goods 
game in the laboratory – a difference that is likely to weaken the behavioral link between the 
 Therefore, more cooperative and less impatient individuals will impose fewer 
(current and future) negative externalities on others and on themselves.  
                                                 
4 Individual fishermen tend to fish the same spots over extended periods of time, and the fishermen seem to 
respect this allocation of spots to individuals. This means that they are able to establish weak property rights, 
implying that they also harm themselves in the future if they catch infertile animals. However, due to the 
mobility of fish and shrimp throughout the fishing grounds, they obviously also harm other fishermen. 
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two situations (Andreoni, 1995).5
Despite these widely different contexts, we find that these laboratory measures of 
other-regarding and time preference in both data sets are important predictors of individual 
behavior in real world CPRs. In line with the predictions, we observe that more cooperative 
and patient shrimp fishermen use shrimp traps with bigger holes where small shrimp – which 
have not yet reached reproductive maturity (i.e., “infertile” shrimp) – can escape (see Figure 
A in the appendix), and more cooperative and patient fishermen who catch fish use fishnets 
with larger mesh sizes in which only bigger fish are caught (see Figures B and C in the 
appendix). Thus we provide evidence that other-regarding and time preferences are not so 
strongly context dependent as to render the economic approach of explaining and predicting 
behavior in terms of relatively stable preferences meaningless.
 Second, the cooperation problem in the field is embedded in 
the natural frame of the environment the subjects face every day, while the public goods game 
was one-shot and framed in an abstract way as a transfer of money from a private account to 
a group account. This makes it more difficult for the subjects to behave according to their pre-
existing preferences because subjects may not fully grasp the prevailing incentives in novel 
situations (Plott, 1996). Third, our experimental time preference measure is related to time 
preferences within a day, while the time preferences involved in the common pool resource 
problem relate to months, years, or even decades. Fourth, our time preference measure is 
based on inter-temporal choices about chocolate and mineral water, while the inter-temporal 
trade off in the CPR problem concerns current versus future yield of shrimp and fish. 
6
Note that the behavior in the laboratory public goods and time preference experiments 
is predicted to be independent because time preferences cannot play a role in the public goods 
experiment. We indeed find that fishermen who are impatient in the time preference 
  
                                                 
5 For evidence in support of Andreoni’s finding see e.g. Anderson et al. (2008). 
6 If preferences were completely context dependent in the sense that every context elicited different preferences 
the economic approach would become meaningless because out of sample predictions and generalizability of 
individual behaviors across contexts would be impossible.  
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experiments are neither more nor less likely to cooperate in the public goods experiments. Our 
study thus finds that both cooperativeness and impatience are independently related to 
resource conversation in a naturally occurring field situation. There are several field studies in 
which the observed behavioral patterns are consistent with the existence of cooperativeness 
(e.g. Feeny et al., 1990; Sneath, 1998; Ostrom, 1999; Bandiera, Barankay, Rasul, 2005; 
Ostrom and Nagendra, 2006; Mas and Moretti, 2009). However, these studies do not show a 
direct link between cooperativeness and the observed field behavior. In fact, they cannot 
exclude the possibility that social pressure or reputation effects exclusively drive cooperation 
behavior in the field. Bandiera, Barankay, Rasul (2005), for example, find that fruit-pickers 
work less if their effort has negative externalities on their co-workers, but only in fruit fields 
where their co-workers can monitor them. In addition, the field experiments by Landry et al. 
(2006) and DellaVigna, List, Malmendier (2009) suggest that charitable donations are not 
necessarily a consequence of altruism, but are often motivated by status concerns or social 
pressure.  
Only a few studies combine laboratory experiments with field observations for a better 
understanding of cooperation behavior in the field (Karlan, 2005; Carpenter and Seki, 
forthcoming; List, 2004a, 2004b, 2006; Laury and Taylor, 08; Benz and Meier, 2008). Karlan 
(2005) conducted economic experiments with borrowers in a Peruvian microcredit program 
and reports that the behavior in a trust game predicts loan repayment. This study shows that 
behavior in laboratory experiments can predict field behavior. However, since many trustors 
knew their trustees personally in the trust game Karlan presents, selfish reputation motives 
might have influenced back-transfers.7
                                                 
7 A similar argument also applies to the public goods game in Karlan (2005) which was not played anonymously. 
In addition, it was a step level public good with many Nash equilibria, implying that purely selfish players 
have an incentive to contribute if they believe they are the pivotal players. This may be the reason why the 
author finds no significant relationship between the public goods game and loan repayment.  
 List’s (2006) study with sports card traders suggests 
that reputational concerns may affect cooperativeness in the field. He finds that dealers 
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classified as “local dealers” show gift exchange behavior in the laboratory and the field, while 
dealers classified as “nonlocal dealers” show less overall cooperation in the field. This finding 
is consistent with strategic reputation building among local dealers; it is also possible, 
however, that local dealers care, per se, about their reputations, i.e., that their reputations have 
a direct effect on their utility.8 The studies by Benz and Meier (2008) and Laury and Taylor 
(2008) examine the link between students’ lab behavior and their charitable contributions. 
This contrasts with our study which predicts the fishermen’s resource conservation behavior 
in their professional activity – constituting their main source of income – with laboratory 
measures of impatience and cooperativeness.9
Our findings help assess the relevance of cooperativeness as well as the scope of 
other-regarding preference theories in naturally occurring situations. We show that there is no 
insurmountable gap between the laboratory and the field, even though the context in our 
laboratory environment differs from the field context in important ways. In addition, our 
evidence shows that both cooperativeness and impatience are important in understanding the 
exploitation of CPRs, suggesting methods for reducing their overexploitation. 
Overexploitation may be constrained, for example, with the help of economic policies that 
shift the perception of the cost of current overexploitation from the future to the present.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I presents the field setting and the field data. 
Section II presents the laboratory experiments. Section III links the behavior of shrimp 
fishermen in the laboratory experiments with their field behavior. Section IV provides further 
corroborating evidence for the role of cooperativeness and impatience in CPR conservation by 
                                                 
8 One important difference between our study and that of List (2006) is that we combine both laboratory and 
field data from the same individuals, enabling a direct study of the extent to which the laboratory preference 
measures predict an individual’s field behavior. 
9 The study by Carpenter and Seki (2005) suggests that cooperative fishermen – as measured by a laboratory 
public goods game – are more likely to self-select in groups which implemented team-based compensation and 
work schemes. Cooperative fishermen are more likely to work in situations where income and operating 
expenses are shared over a group of fishing boats than in those environments where sharing only occurs 
among the members of the own boat. In contrast to our study, the authors do not examine individual 
cooperation behavior in the field, but only aggregate productivity across the two different groups. 
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linking the behavior of fishermen who catch fish in the laboratory experiments with their field 
behavior. Section V concludes.  
 
I. Field Setting and the Data  
A. Field Setting  
Our study took place at a lake in northeastern Brazil. Several rural fishing villages10 are 
situated around this lake; fishing is the main and often the only possible way of earning a 
living. Fishermen in this setting catch shrimp and fish on their own, sell their catch at fish 
markets, thus providing their family with nutrition and income. There is free access to the 
fishing grounds (shrimp and fishing grounds), and a fisherman’s capital requirements are 
rather low. For catching shrimp, fishermen only need a small boat and shrimp traps which 
they manufacture from used PET bottles.11 While fishing, fishermen are typically scattered 
over the lake and fish at their preferred, sometimes remote spot(s). Other fishermen usually 
respect these spots, i.e. most fishermen do not fish at or close to another fisherman's spot. 
Their respect for others’ fishing spots means that the fishing ground at this lake is not a pure 
CPR, but shares some features of a private property. The fishermen are aware of the fact that 
overfishing – for instance by using shrimp traps with small holes – has negative externalities 
on others12
                                                 
10 We use the term "villages" for reasons of simplicity. In this field setting, these are sometimes not villages in 
the ordinary sense, but rather community agglomerations with unclear borders between the neighboring 
community agglomerations or villages.  
, but the private aspect of their fishing spots also means that private investments 
like refraining from catching small shrimp or fish affect their own chance of catching these 
same shrimp or fish at a larger size at the same spot in the future.  
11 Fishermen typically use a fishnet for catching fish. The costs for a fishnet can be normally paid with the 
income generated from one week's catch.  
12 When fishermen meet, the use of PET bottles with small holes (and fishing with fishnets with small mesh 
sizes) is frequently discussed and recognized as a cause of overfishing. 
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There are no legal constraints on the fishing instruments we study, and there are no 
legal regulations concerning catching shrimp.13
 
 In recent years, many fishermen have 
complained about decreasing catch rates, which they mostly blame on the overexploitation of 
the shrimp and fish resources, i.e., catching large amounts of infertile shrimp and fish 
(Cavalcanti, 2003). A research project with fishermen revealed their strong concern about the 
excessive exploitation of shrimp resources in this field setting (Cavalcanti, Schläpfer, Schmid, 
2010). Governmental and local university institutions have taken note of the severity of the 
situation and have initiated first steps to help sustain the fishing grounds. A management 
council was introduced to examine the current fishing situation.  
B. Field Data 
In the following sections, we report the 2008 data from the fishermen catching shrimp 
(‘shrimpers’). The 2006 data for the fishermen is presented briefly as further corroborating 
evidence in section IV.14
We ran one experimental session in each community agglomeration, typically in a 
local school building. Participants were not allowed to speak with other participants during 
the experimental session. Participants received a code to ensure anonymity for the laboratory 
 We selected community agglomerations that can be considered as 
traditional fishing villages and which were accessible by car. In these villages, we 
investigated the fishing instruments of 114 shrimpers recruited with the help of the village 
leaders who invited the village members to a “fishermen’s meeting”. All 114 shrimpers 
agreed to participate in the experiments. In addition, all of them were also willing to answer 
the survey questions.   
                                                 
13 There is only one legal regulation concerning fishing, which is the prohibition of catching small fish (below 
20–30 centimeters, depending on fish type). This regulation, however, is not enforced.  
14  A more detailed analysis of the 2006 data can be found in the working paper (Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2008). 
 9 
experiments and surveys15, and were free to leave at any point in time. The majority of our 
participants were male (73%), and were experienced, full-time shrimpers who generated their 
income mainly from shrimping. On average, the shrimpers had been in the profession for 17.4 
years and their average daily working time was roughly 4 hours, not including the time spent 
preparing and selling the shrimp. 57% derived their income exclusively from shrimping, and 
another 29.5% derived a small additional income from selling agricultural products. In order 
to control for income, we also asked participants about their monthly income. On average, 
they earn a monthly income of 302 Reais from all activities.16 Participants spent on average 
3.4 years in school and had 3.3 children. 95.4% of the shrimpers only used modified PET 
bottles (mean = 336 bottles) with small holes to catch shrimp.17
We take the shrimpers shrimp traps as a measure of their cooperativeness in sustaining 
the fishing grounds. Shrimpers manufacture their shrimp traps by making holes in used PET 
bottles. The smaller the holes in the traps, the greater the share of infertile shrimp caught in 
the trap (i.e. those with a length smaller than three centimeters). The average size (i.e., length) 
of caught shrimp is usually between two and three centimeters. For our purposes it is 
important to stress that even small variations in the millimeter domain make a difference as to 
how many infertile shrimp are caught. Thus, by varying the size of the holes in the shrimp 
trap, the shrimpers determine the extent to which they decrease their own and other shrimpers 
future yield by catching small, infertile shrimp.  
 Summary Table A in the 
appendix provides an overview of the survey measures we use in our estimations. 
                                                 
15 At the beginning of the experimental session, each participant filled out a code form that linked his or her 
name to an individual code. This code, instead of the participant's name, was then used on surveys, decision 
sheets, and envelopes during the experiments. Only the main experimenter had access to the code forms after 
termination of the experimental session. Participants collected their earnings by showing their codes to the 
main experimenter. 
16 The Brazilian currency is called Real (singular) or Reais (plural). 1 Real equaled US $ 0.47 in September 
2008, 302.4 Reais = US $ 142.1. 
17 The remaining 4.6% use two different shrimp traps at the same time (PET bottles and “bamboo baskets”). 
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We collected most bottles several months after the experiment, examined one to two 
bottles from each of 114 shrimpers and measured five to ten holes in each bottle at the 0.1 
centimeter level to construct our variable hole size. We collected traps in fishermen’s 
meetings. In two meetings, we collected traps after we conducted the reported experiments (n 
= 38). In the remaining meetings, we collected the shrimp traps approximately six months 
after the experiments, also in fishermen’s meetings. Shrimpers typically use an instrument 
like a pen to make holes. We find that for a given shrimper there is little variation in the 
different holes in his shrimp trap. Thus, we decided during the data collection to reduce the 
holes measured per bottle from ten (n = 39) to five (n = 75). We asked fishermen to bring two 
shrimp traps to the fishermen’s meetings. 103 of 114 shrimpers brought two traps, and the 
remaining 11 shrimpers. 18 19
 
 This variable denotes the average size of the holes in the shrimp 
traps for each fisherman. Figure 1 shows the distribution of hole sizes in our sample. The 
average hole size is 0.448 centimeters. Half of our participants use shrimp traps with a hole 
size between 0.367 and 0.500 centimeters, while 90% of the average hole size lies between 
0.320 and 0.580 centimeters.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
The use of hole size as a measure of shrimpers cooperativeness in the field has several 
advantages compared to other indices of cooperativeness such as the catch quantity or catch 
composition. First, catch quantity is not an unambiguous measure of the extent to which a 
                                                 
18 In appendix Table C, we control for whether the data were collected in spring or fall, whether we measured 
five or ten holes and whether a fishermen brought two or one bottle to the meeting. We find that these 
variables do not affect the pattern of our findings. 
19 Because it was impossible to measure holes in all shrimp traps (or measure traps from a random sample) we 
cannot exclude the possibility that our sample of traps is biased. However, we are confident that we collected a 
representative and unbiased sample of shrimp traps. First, it was immediately obvious that the fishermen used 
the shrimp traps (smell, staining, and abrasion) and we can thus exclude the possibility that they gave us traps 
that they did not use. Second, it is immediately clear whether fishermen modified used traps (e.g. by increasing 
the size of holes) because there are many holes in a trap that are located close to each other. If holes were 
increased substantially, the distance to the other holes would diminish and make the trap (look) fragile. We did 
not find any bottle that looked modified. Third, most fishermen handed over traps which have very small holes 
(typically below 0.5 centimeters) in which very small shrimp are trapped. Thus, it seems unlikely that a 
substantial fraction of fishermen gave us unusual bottles with larger holes or increased the size of the holes. 
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fisherman decreases the future yield for himself and for others because – in principle – a large 
quantity of shrimp caught need not contain many infertile shrimp. In fact, catching a large 
quantity of big shrimp may even be perceived as a skill and not necessarily as an 
uncooperative act among shrimpers. A small hole size, in contrast, is clearly associated with 
the persistent catch of small, infertile, shrimp which diminishes the future shrimp yield. In 
practice, a small hole size will, of course, lead to a larger quantity of shrimp caught20
The second advantage of hole size as a measure of cooperativeness derives from the 
fact that the shrimp traps are durable goods that can be used over long periods of time. Thus, 
our hole size measure gives us a measure of cooperativeness over an extended time period. As 
the shrimpers do not record their catch quantity or their catch composition over time, it is 
impossible to collect objective data on these variables over longer time periods (i.e. several 
months). We would instead have to rely on self-reported data which tend to be less reliable. 
This is another reason why we prefer the hole size measure.
, but 
because a larger quantity of shrimp caught is a less precise indicator of cooperativeness in the 
field, the hole size measure is preferable.  
21
We also collected survey data regarding participant’s perception and beliefs about 
current CPR exploitation in their setting which are measured on an ordinal scale. The variable 
field perception shrimpers measures the participant’s perception about the necessity of the 
introduction of an environmental program limiting the use of PET bottles with small holes. 
     
                                                 
20 Our measure of hole size is negatively related to self-reported catch quantity. In the survey, we asked 
fishermen to estimate how many liters of shrimp they catch in general during a good week and find that the 
larger the hole size, the fewer liters of shrimp the fishermen report catching (r =- 0.246, p=0.0077). In addition 
to the reasons given in the text, we did not use our catch quantity measure because it is self-reported and 
therefore imprecise. This contrasts with our hole size measure which is based on our own precise 
measurements.  
21 We would like to point out, however, that we also examined the relationship between the self-reported 
composition of the shrimp catch and laboratory measures of cooperativeness and impatience in an earlier 
version of this paper (Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2008). The results in the earlier version were in line with the 
results we present below, i.e. fishermen that are more impatient and less cooperative in the laboratory 
experiments had a catch composition that contained a larger share of small, infertile, shrimp. This fact supports 
the robustness of our findings; it is reassuring that different measures of cooperativeness in the field lead to 
similar results.  
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The variable field belief shrimpers measures the participant’s belief about the fraction of the 
other participant’s shrimp catch that is below two centimeters. Furthermore, we measure 
whether participants live centrally by asking how many people live in their close 
neighborhood. The survey was collected on the same day the laboratory experiments were 
conducted. In addition, we have data on the shrimpers' cognitive ability, which we measured 
by giving them three Raven`s matrices to solve (the share of correct answers ranged from 
32.1% with zero, 39.7% with one, 23.1% with two, and 5.1% with three).22
 
  
II. The Laboratory Experiments  
A. The Public Goods Experiment with Shrimpers 
Shrimpers took part in an anonymous laboratory public goods experiment (PGE) with 
comparatively high monetary stakes. The participants earned approximately 1.8 times their 
available daily income during an experimental session. They were divided into groups of 
three and played this experiment for one period. The payoff function was 
( ) 





+×+−=∏ ∑
≠
i
ij
jijii xxxxx 5.0)10(, . Each participant had to decide how many out of 
ten monetary units (MUs) he wants to contribute ( { }10,0∈ix ) to a public good.23
                                                 
22 Raven`s matrices are multiple choice tests of abstract reasoning. They are widely accepted as a culture-free 
measure of cognitive skills. In each of our three tests, we presented participants with six segments and asked 
them to find the missing segment required to complete a larger pattern.  
 For each 
unit he contributed, he increased each of his group members' monetary payoff j by 0.5 MUs, 
while simultaneously reducing his own balance by 0.5 MUs. For each unit one of his group 
members decided to contribute, his own balance was increased by 0.5 MUs. Since the 
participants net return from contributing was negative, selfish participants should never 
contribute. However, if none of the three individuals in the group decided to contribute, each 
23 One MU always equaled one Real if the PGE was selected for payment. Participants took part in five 
experiments (lottery experiment, coordination experiment, charity experiment, and competition experiment out 
of which two experiments were paid out. Participants only knew which two experiments were actually paid out 
after they had played all experiments. The results from the other experiments are available upon request. 
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of them only earned 10 MUs, compared to 15 MUs if all of them contributed all ten MUs. The 
experiment was framed in abstract and neutral terms. Participants decided how many of the 
ten MUs they want to keep in their private account and how many they want to transfer to a 
group account. They were given two envelopes, one containing ten MUs (i.e. their 
endowment on the private account) and one containing 0 MUs. The participants could transfer 
MUs from one envelope to the other; then they put both envelopes in a box. During the 
decision, the experimenter turned his back on the subject so that the participant was sure that 
the experimenter did not know his decision. After participants made their decisions, they were 
asked about their expectations of others` contributions. If they guessed another participant's 
contribution correctly, they could win five additional MUs. All rules were explained 
individually to the participants. No participant was informed about the identity and individual 
contribution decisions of his group members. The instructions are reproduced in the appendix. 
Most shrimpers do not behave completely selfishly, but contribute to the public good 
(only 15.8% do not contribute and 11.4% contribute only one MU). 21.1% contribute five 
MUs and 18.4% contribute more than five MUs. Approximately half of the participants 
contribute no more than three MUs (58 out of 114). In regression Table B in the appendix, we 
observe that expectations about the contributions of the other group members are by far the 
most important variable for predicting the behavior in the PGE (t>5.05, p<0.0001) – a finding 
in line with earlier evidence and that suggests that many individuals are conditionally 
cooperative (Fischbacher, Gächter, Fehr, 2001, Keser and van Winden, 2002; Frey and Meier, 
2004; Shang and Croson, 2008). In addition, we find that two control variables are at least 
marginally significant in models 1 and 4. We observe that more experienced shrimpers 
contribute more (t>1.79, p<0.076), and that shrimpers who report a higher monthly income 
contribute more (t>1.90, p<0.061). We control for these variables in the following 
regressions.  
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B. The Time Preference Experiment with Shrimpers 
At the beginning of the experimental session, we implemented a time preference experiment 
(TPE) to obtain a measure for impatience. In this TPE, all participants had to indicate whether 
they preferred two pralines immediately or three pralines at the end of the experimental 
session (on the same day) when they received their overall monetary payments from the 
experiment. The pralines (“Sonho de Valsa”) are very popular among the participants; the 
vast majority (97%) liked the pralines (variable name: preference for praline).  
We have time preference data from this experiment for 83 of our 114 shrimpers.24 
61.45% are patient and prefer waiting approximately two hours until the end of the 
experimental session to get three pralines, while the remaining 38.55% are impatient and 
prefer receiving two pralines immediately.25
 
 In column 2 of regression Table B, we observe 
that none of the control variables significantly predicts the decision in the TPE. 
C. The Relation between Other-Regarding Preferences and Impatience in the Laboratory  
Other-regarding preferences and impatience might play an important role in explaining the 
individual degree of CPR exploitation in the field. The laboratory provides an opportunity for 
deriving distinct measures for both factors. We use our PGE to obtain an individual measure 
of other-regarding preferences and the TPE to obtain an individual measure of impatience. 
Because there are no intertemporal spillovers in the PGE, measured impatience in the TPE 
should not predict cooperativeness in the laboratory. Our data confirm this prediction. 
Individuals who are impatient in the TPE are neither more nor less likely to contribute in the 
PGE (Fisher Exact Test, p=0.574). This is also true after controlling for covariates. In 
                                                 
24 Unfortunately, we could not play the TPE in two of our experimental sessions because the pralines were sold 
out in the local store.  
25 Note that once the pralines were given to the participants, they had to be consumed right away (and typically 
were) because they would otherwise melt in the heat. We kept the pralines in a cooler before we distributed 
them to the participants.  
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regression Table B, models 3 and 4, we observe that the impatience dummy is insignificant 
(p>0.276).26
III. Predicting Cooperation in the Field with Laboratory Preference Measures 
  
The heart of this paper uses our laboratory preference measures to predict individual levels of 
CPR exploitation. We use the public goods and time preference experiment to predict the 
average hole size in the fishermen's shrimp traps. We hypothesize (i) that fishermen who 
contribute more in the PGE use shrimp traps with bigger holes so that small, infertile, shrimp 
can escape more easily, and (ii) that fishermen who are impatient in the TPE use shrimp traps 
with smaller holes that are more exploitative of the fishing grounds.  
 
A. Other-regarding Preferences and Hole Size in Shrimp Traps 
Figure 2 provides a first insight into the relationship between contributions in the PGE and the 
average hole size in the shrimp traps. This figure shows the average hole size for fishermen 
categorized in three groups according to their level of contributions in the PGE. Fishermen 
with the lowest contributions (0 or 1 MUs) have the smallest hole sizes (0.413 centimeters, 
N=31), followed by fishermen with medium contributions (2–4 MUs, 0.443 centimeters, 
N=38). Fishermen with the highest contributions who contribute at least half of their 
endowment have substantially larger hole sizes than the other fishermen (0.482 centimeters, 
N=45). Overall, there is a positive and highly significant correlation between contributions in 
the PGE (0,1,…,10) and hole size (r=0.253, p=0.0067).  
We investigate whether the impact of lab cooperation on the hole size is robust to 
different specifications and controls in the regressions in Table 1. Model (1) shows that 
without using controls, each MU contributed in the public goods game (0,1,2…,10) is 
                                                 
26 The absence of a correlation between our time preference measure and our lab cooperation measure replicates 
the finding in an older working paper version (Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2008). Moreover, there is no significant 
relationship between this time preference measure and children or altruism in a charity experiment (p>0.28 in 
both cases). Thus, it seems unlikely that our time preference measure contains care for children, 
cooperativeness or altruism. 
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associated with a 0.0105 centimeter increase in average hole size (t=2.58, p=0.011), which 
means that a maximally cooperative fishermen uses on average 0.105 centimeter larger holes 
(i.e. approximately 25% larger holes) than a fully selfish fisherman who contributes nothing 
to the laboratory public good. Model (3) shows the effect after adding several controls. The 
effect is of similar size to that in Model (1) and highly significant (t=2.44, p=0.016). In model 
(4), we add the impatience dummy as a control variable. This leaves the size (0.0103) and the 
significance (t=2.51, p=0.014) of the coefficient of individual contribution levels unaffected. 
We introduce village/community agglomeration fixed effects in model (5) to account for 
potential regional differences. The coefficient of individuals’ contributions in the PGE is 
slightly smaller in this regression, but still significant (t=2.21, p=0.030).  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
B. Impatience and Holes in Shrimp Traps 
The evidence indicates that fishermen who are impatient in the TPE and prefer two pralines 
immediately over three pralines at the end of the experimental session use smaller holes in 
their shrimp traps than patient fishermen. The average hole size for impatient fishermen is 
0.406 centimeters, whereas patient fishermen who prefer three pralines at the end of the 
experimental session use holes that are on average 0.457 centimeters. Regressions 2, 4, and 5 
in Table 1 indicate that this difference in hole size is significant and robust to the inclusion of 
controls. In the absence of controls (model 2), the estimated coefficient is roughly 0.05 
centimeters with a t-value of 2.19 and a p-value of 0.031. Model (4), which adds our standard 
control variables, leaves the size and the significance of the coefficient largely unchanged 
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(coefficient = 0.054 centimeter, t=2.26, p=0.027). Impatience remains also significant at the 5 
percent level after controlling for village fixed effects (model 5).27 28
Apart from contributions in the PGE and impatience, children is the only significant 
predictor of hole size in all three models with controls (t=1.88,p<0.065). Fishermen with more 
children use larger hole sizes, suggesting that they are more concerned about sustainable 
fishing, perhaps because they want their children to be able to sustain their living as 
fishermen. Moreover, some variables seem to play a role for hole size, although they are not 
significant in all regressions. The variables field perception shrimpers and years in profession 
are significant in models 4 and 5. Fishermen who favor the introduction of an environmental 
program which aims to limit the use of shrimp traps with small holes tend to use larger holes 
in their shrimp traps. Thus, to the extent to which information policies raise the awareness of 
the necessity of environmental programs these policies may have an environmentally 
beneficial effect on the fishermen’s private fishing practices. . Years in profession is 
negatively related to hole size, suggesting that policies aiming at mitigating CPR exploitation 
should be targeted towards more experienced fishermen in particular. The variable field belief 
shrimpers is significant in model , and marginally significant in model 5. Fishermen who 
believe that other fishermen catch a larger fraction of small shrimp use smaller holes, which is 
consistent with the assumption that fishermen are also conditionally (un-) cooperative in the 
field.
  
29
                                                 
27 We also examined whether there is an interaction effect between time and other-regarding preferences on hole 
size. Depending on the model specification, the interaction term is not or only marginally significant. Note that 
because fishermen can establish some elementary (i.e. weak) forms of property rights by using the same 
fishing spots for longer time periods, their time preferences can play a role in the field regardless of whether 
they have other-regarding preferences.  
 In addition, the regression table shows that male fishermen tend to use larger holes, 
28 We also measured the role of cognitive skill in hole size. We have data on cognitive skills (measured by 
Raven’s matrices) for 78 fishermen for whom we also have data on hole size as well as on other-regarding and 
time preferences. We find that our measure for cognitive skills is completely unrelated to hole size; this holds 
regardless of whether we look at the pure correlation (r=-0.01, p=0.914) or at the coefficient of this variable in 
our regression models (e.g. p=0.618 in model 3). The additional control for cognitive skills also leaves the 
effect of individual contribution levels and impatience on hole size largely unchanged (coefficient for 
cooperativeness=0.0097, p=0.028; coefficient for impatience=-0.0615, p=0.023 in model 4, for example). 
29 An alternative explanation, however, could be that fishermen who catch a larger fraction of small shrimp also 
(falsely) project that other fishermen catch a larger fraction of small shrimp. 
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but this effect becomes insignificant after controlling for village fixed effects. The number of 
shrimp traps in use that fishermen report is significantly predictive of hole size in model 3 and 
marginally predictive in model 4, showing that fishermen who use larger holes also tend to 
use fewer shrimp traps.30
We would also like to point out that the number of shrimp traps is significantly 
negatively correlated to laboratory cooperativeness (r=-0.137, p=0.044), and that the weekly 
time spent catching shrimp is also significantly negatively correlated to laboratory 
cooperativeness (r=-0.150, p=0.028). This shows that more cooperative fishermen not only 
use larger holes in their traps, but also report using fewer traps and spending less time 
catching shrimp. 
 
 
IV. Further corroborating evidence 
In this section, we provide further evidence on the role of other-regarding and time 
preferences for CPR conservation by examining the behavior of fishermen most of whom use 
fishnets to catch fish. The fishnets differ according to their mesh size, and the smaller the 
fishnet mesh size, the more infertile fish are caught in the fishnet.31
                                                 
30 Note that the number of shrimp traps in use is compared to hole size an inferior measure of CPR exploitation. 
First, the measure is self-reported and, second the number of shrimp traps is not informative about the catch 
composition, i.e. it provides no information about the fraction of small, not yet fertile, shrimp. Note also that 
fishermen vary the quantity of shrimp traps they use. 
 Thus, the same arguments 
that speak for hole size as a measure of cooperativeness in the field also apply for mesh size. 
We hypothesized that fishermen who display more cooperation in a public goods experiment 
31 Note that while fishnets differ according to their mesh size, the price of the fishnet is independent of the mesh 
size. Fishnets with smaller mesh sizes are not more expensive than fishnets with bigger mesh sizes. If 
fishermen possess more than one fishnet, the variable mesh size specifies the mesh size of the fishnet that is 
used most frequently. Using a fishnet with a larger mesh size leads to an income reduction of approximately 
8%. We asked fishermen to fill out a daily report for several weeks where they reported which mesh size they 
used, the amount of fish they caught, and the weight of fish caught in kilograms. Nine fishermen reported 
frequently using two different mesh sizes. When they use the smaller mesh size, they report catching a 21.5% 
larger number of fish per hour (p < 0.01) and 16% more kilograms of fish per hour (p = 0.07). If we assume 
that the additional fish caught with a small mesh size are all small fish that are sold at a 50% lower price (e.g., 
instead of a normalized price of 1 for larger fish the small fish are sold at a price of 0.5), the fishermen who 
use a small mesh size earn roughly 8% (0.16 x 0.5) more income per hour. A 50% lower price for small fish is 
a realistic assumption according to information provided by the fishermen and based on our own observations.  
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use fishnets with larger mesh sizes and predict that impatient fishermen use smaller mesh 
sizes. 
 
A. The 2006 Field Data 
We collected data on the mesh sizes of the fishnets from two sources: survey responses in 
2006 and field observations in 2008. While re-visiting the fishermen in 2008, we investigated 
the fishnets of approximately every third fisherman who participated in 2006 and who used a 
fishnet (35 out of 121).32
The fishermen also took part in a laboratory public goods and time preference 
experiment played anonymously (PGE 06 and TPE 06). In the PGE 06 with high stakes 
(participants earned on average 1.37 times of their daily income), fishermen had to decide 
how many of seven MUs (3 MUs = 1 Brazilian Real) they contributed to a public good in 
each of five different periods – which contrasts with the one period PGE 08. The group size 
was four and stable during all periods. Because the fishermen’s net return from contributing to 
the public good was negative, never contributing anything was always in their material 
interest if the selfishness and rationality of all individuals was common knowledge. The more 
cooperative the fishermen are, however, the more we expect them to contribute. 87% 
contributed in the first period, with almost half of the fishermen contributing between three 
and five units. Contributions declined continuously in the remaining four periods.  
 We find that the two year old survey responses are very much in line 
with the recent field data (r = 0.70; p<0.0001). Figure D in the appendix illustrates the relation 
between the survey data and the field observations. Almost two-thirds of the fishermen use a 
mesh size smaller than five centimeters, with a mean of 4.42 centimeters. The most frequently 
used mesh sizes are 3.5, 5, and 6 centimeters. Figure E in the appendix shows the distribution 
of mesh sizes in our sample. 
                                                 
32 Typically, we went to the fishermen's houses or to the lake and asked them to show us their fishnets. 
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In the TPE 06, fishermen had to indicate whether they preferred one bottle of mineral 
water immediately or two bottles the next day. If they preferred the good immediately, the 
fishermen received it right after the experiment. If they preferred two units of the good the 
next day, we distributed vouchers with which they could collect their good the next day at the 
village leader's house. The village leader was elected by the residents and is usually 
considered an extraordinarily trustworthy person.33
 
 We observe that 59.6% were impatient 
and preferred one bottle of mineral water immediately. As in our 2008 laboratory 
experiments, we find no significant relationship between cooperativeness and impatience in 
the 2006 experiments. 
 
B. Cooperativeness, Impatience, and Fishnet Mesh Size  
We find a highly significant positive relationship between behavior in the PGE 06 and mesh 
size. The correlation between contributions in the PGE 06 and mesh size is 0.31 (Pearson, 
p=0.0004). If we perform a median split and divide the fishermen into two equally sized 
groups according to their contributions in the first period of the PGE34
                                                 
33 In practice, we had the strong impression that the participating fishermen were confident about receiving their 
good (the next day). Nevertheless, before individuals made their choice in the TPE, we assured them that they 
would receive their good. We also asked many participants if they were concerned about not receiving their 
good – which was not the case. Participating fishermen also had the possibility of seeing the experimenters 
give the village leaders the mineral water for distribution on the next day. After the experiments, we asked the 
village leader whether all participants collected their goods – which was the case. When we re-visited the 
participants, none complained about not receiving her/his good. 
, we observe that those 
who are less cooperative and who contribute less than five MUs (N=61) use an average mesh 
size of 4.03 centimeters (the mode in this group is 3.5 centimeters with 25 of the 61 subjects 
choosing the mode), whereas those who are more cooperative and contribute at least five MUs 
(N=62) use an average mesh size of 4.73 centimeters (there are two modes at 5 and 6 
centimeters in this subgroup with 15 subjects each choosing the mode). The difference in 
34 We find that contributions in periods 2-5 are highly correlated to contributions in the first period (r = 0.715, 
p<0.00001) and that the results are similar if we use the average contributions in all five periods as a measure 
instead of the contribution in the first period (see Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2008).  
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mesh size between the low and the high contributors is significant at any conventional level 
(t=-3.891, p=0.0002) and substantial.35
In regression Table 2, we use two OLS models to predict the mesh size. In model (1), 
we use the behavior in our two laboratory experiments as independent variables and control 
for several socio-economic and fishing related measures and for village fixed effects. We find 
that the individual levels of contributions in the first period of the PGE 06 are positively 
related to fishnet mesh size. Each MU contributed in the first period of the PGE is associated 
with a 0.133 centimeter larger mesh size (t=2.72, p=0.008). In model (2), we only use the 
small sub-sample of 35 fishermen where we observed the fishnets and we control for the 
significant covariates from model (1). We still find a marginally significant relationship for 
cooperativeness (t=1.80, p = 0.083).  
  
We also find a negative effect of impatience on mesh size in model (1). Fishermen 
who are impatient and prefer one bottle of mineral water immediately over two bottles 
tomorrow use 0.366 centimeter smaller mesh sizes (t=1.99, p=0.049). In our smaller 
subsample with only those fishermen for whom we directly observed the fishnets (model 2), 
the coefficient for impatience is even larger (t=1.86, p=0.074).  
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
The regressions in Table 2 also show that the variable field perception fishermen which we 
measured in a survey plays an important role in both models. Fishermen who reported already 
perceiving a relatively small mesh size as harmful tend to use larger mesh sizes. In addition, 
we find that the variable field belief fishermen is significant in both models. It turns out that if 
                                                 
35 While it is difficult to find an exact correlation between a one centimeter difference in mesh size with respect 
to the size of fish ultimately caught (since this depends on the type of fish), the fishermen estimate this to be 
approximately 3–7 centimeters. Note as a rough reference point that small fish below the legal minimum size 
(20–30 centimeters depending on fish type) are frequently caught in fishnets with mesh sizes smaller than five 
centimeters.  
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a fisherman reports being more pessimistic about the other fishermen's exploitation levels, the 
more likely he is to use a small mesh size.  
 
V. Conclusion 
In this paper, we show that cooperativeness plays an important role in economic decisions 
with lasting consequences in naturally occurring situations. We find in two different data sets 
that shrimpers and fishermen who behave more prosocially in a public goods experiment use 
fishing instruments that are less likely to exploit the fishing grounds. At the same time, we 
show that impatience plays a significant role in cooperation in the field; in both data sets, 
fishermen who are impatient in a time preference experiment use fishing instruments that are 
more likely to exploit the fishing grounds. We establish a link between laboratory and field 
behavior, even though there are important contextual differences between the lab and the field 
environment. Subjects play a one-shot (or five periods) public goods game in the lab, while 
they face a permanent common pool resource problem in the field; the lab experiment is 
framed in abstract terms, while subjects face the cooperation problem in its naturally 
occurring frame in the field; and we elicited time preferences over hours and days in the lab, 
while individuals’ time preferences over weeks, months, and years matter in the field.  
The fact that we nevertheless find a robust and significant link between our laboratory 
preference measures and our field measures challenges the view that an economic approach 
that is based on relatively stable preferences is useless; while preferences may be affected by 
contextual factors they are not so highly context-dependent as to render generalizability and 
predictability across contexts impossible.  
While we should take care when extrapolating economic preferences, we believe that 
our results also may have important implications for policymakers, managers, and social 
scientists. They provide empirical evidence that taking impatience into account is useful when 
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designing policy measures, as it is an obstacle in implementing resource preserving policies. 
Likewise, knowledge about the conditional nature of fishermen’s cooperativeness may be 
useful, i.e., their conditional willingness to cooperate in concrete situations, even if 
cooperation goes against their immediate self-interest. Thaler and Benartzi (2004) designed 
the Smart commitment mechanism which helped impatient employees who lack self-control 
increase their future savings.  
We imagine a similar mechanism for promoting resource conservation which would 
incorporate both the propensity to discount future outcomes as well as the propensity to 
cooperate voluntarily (if others cooperate as well). Individuals could be approached to commit 
in advance to change their behavior towards a more sustainable use of resources, but this 
commitment would only become binding if a specified majority of the other resource users 
also were to commit. For example, the fishermen could commit (e.g., by signing a contract 
with an environmental agency) to exchange their fishnets with small mesh size for fishnets 
with bigger mesh size in the future if a specified majority of the other fishermen were also 
willing to commit to this policy. This proposal takes advantage of the conditional nature of 
fishermen’s willingness to cooperate and furthermore reduces the perception of the cost of 
cooperation by shifting the fishnet exchange into the future. Thus, impatient individuals who 
lack self-control and conditionally cooperative individuals would be more likely to commit to 
this policy than to an alternative policy requiring unconditional cooperation and imposing the 
cost of cooperation in the current period. Similar mechanisms could be applied to other 
settings as well. For example, policymakers could ask commuters in metropolitan areas to 
commit to buy a one-month ticket for public transportation for the following year as soon as a 
sufficient number of commuters were also willing to keep this commitment.  
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TABLES 
 
Table 1―Determinants of Size of Holes in Shrimp Traps                                                                                                               
(OLS) 
            
        
Dependent Variable Average Size of Holes in Shrimp Trap in cm 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 
      
Contribution in PGE  
(in MUs) 
0.0105**  0.0094** 0.0103** 0.0088** 
(0.0041)  (0.0038) (0.0041) (0.0040) 
Impatience                        
(Praline Dummy) 
 –0.0504**  –0.0539** –0.0467** 
 (0.0230)  (0.0238) (0.0217) 
Belief in PGE   –0.0011 0.0003 –0.0001 
  (0.0051) (0.0055) (0.0053) 
Preference for Praline                         –0.1962 –0.1593 
   (0.1425) (0.1228) 
Age   –0.0011 –0.0003 –0.0009 
  (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
Gender (Male Dummy)   0.0893*** 0.0663*** 0.0515 
  (0.0232) (0.0232) (0.0332) 
Children   0.0121** 0.0137** 0.0109* 
  (0.0056) (0.0062) (0.0058) 
Centrality   –0.0001 –0.0003 –0.0005 
  (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Years of Schooling   –0.0034 –0.0026 –0.0004 
  (0.0039) (0.0046) (0.0045) 
Years in Occupation   –0.0008 –0.0024** –0.0022** 
  (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Field Perception 
Shrimpers 
  0.0195 0.0437** 0.0490** 
  (0.0195) (0.0203) (0.0206) 
Field Belief Shrimpers   –0.0140 –0.0286** –0.0229* 
  (0.0120) (0.0134) (0.0137) 
Daily Hours Fishing   0.0050 0.0091 0.0039 
  (0.0065) (0.0060) (0.0062) 
Quantity of Shrimp 
Traps 
  –0.0001** –0.0001* –0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Income   –0.0000 –0.0001* –0.0001 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Constant 0.4122*** 0.4061*** 0.3115*** 0.4432** 0.4435** 
(0.0174) (0.0164) (0.0850) (0.1700) (0.1705) 
Village Fixed Effects? no no no no yes 
Observations 114 83 112 83 83 
R2 0.064 0.051 0.272 0.400 0.484 
 Notes: *** 99-percent significance, ** 95-percent significance; * 90-percent significance. Robust Standard 
Errors in Parentheses.  
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Table 2―Determinants of Mesh Size of Fishnet                                                                                                                
(OLS) 
      
    
Dependent Variable Frequently Used Mesh Size of Fishnet in cm 
Model 1 2 
   
Contribution in First Period of 
PGE (in MUs) 
0.133*** 0.171* 
(0.049) (0.095) 
Impatience                                 
(Mineral Water Dummy) 
–0.366** –0.641* 
(0.184) (0.345) 
Age -0.000  
(0.013)  
Gender (Male Dummy) 0.732*  
(0.374)  
Children 0.023  
(0.037)  
Years of Schooling –0.010  
(0.033)  
Years in Occupation 0.007  
(0.010)  
Field Belief Fishermen 0.182** 0.503** 
(0.073) (0.244) 
Field Perception Fishermen 0.156*** 0.352** 
(0.056) (0.132) 
Belief in first Period of PGE 0.009 -0.144 
(0.059) (0.141) 
Weekly Hours Fishing –0.006  
(0.006)  
Constant 2.784*** 2.023** 
(0.664) (0.985) 
Village Fixed Effects? yes no 
Observations 121 35 
R2 0.334 0.227 
 Notes: *** 99-percent significance, ** 95-percent significance; * 90-percent significance. 
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses.  
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FIGURES 
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Figure 1: Size of Holes in Shrimp Traps (Hole Size)
Note: data is categorized into small groups for illustrative reasons
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Level of Contribution in Public Goods Experiment
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APPENDIX TABLES 
Table A―Summary Table of Variables used in Estimation 
          
Variable Name Explanation Mean Standard Deviation N 
Hole Size Mean size of holes in shrimp traps in 
centimeters 
0.45 0.11 114 
Contribution in 
PGE  (in MUs) 
0 (lowest) -10 (highest) 3.63 2.69 114 
Impatience                        
(Praline Dummy) 
0 = prefers two pralines immediately, 1 = 
prefers three pralines approximately two 
hours later 
0.39 0.49 83 
Belief in PGE Belief about group members’ contribution 
level; 0 (lowest) -10 (highest) 
3.77 2.47 114 
    
Preference for 
Praline 
0=does not like praline, 1= likes praline 0.98 0.15 83 
    
Age Age in years 37.43 13.02 114 
    
Gender  Male dummy; 1=female, 2=male 1.74 0.44 114 
Children Number of children in total (both living at 
home and not) 
3.31 3.01 113 
    
Centrality Number of people living in close 
surrounding, i.e, in two minutes walking 
distance 
25.20 28.72 114 
    
Education Years of schooling 3.42 2.55 113 
    
Years in 
Occupation 
Years fishing professionally 17.44 11.24 114 
    
Field Belief 
Shrimpers 
 
Belief about the fraction of the other 
fishermen’s shrimp catch that is below two 
centimeters. 0=zero, 1=very low, 2=low, 
3=medium, 4=large 
3.19 0.94 114 
    
Field Perception 
Shrimpers 
Perception about necessity to introduce an 
environmental program which aims at  
limiting the use of PET bottles with small 
holes. 0=not necessary, 1=probably 
necessary, 2=necessary, 3=absolutely  
necessary 
2.54 0.53 114 
    Daily Hours 
Fishing 
Average daily work time not including the 
time for preparing and selling the shrimp 
3.69 1.57 114 
Quantity of Shrimp 
Traps 
Number of PET bottles in possession 335.69 296.67 114 
    
 Income Monthly income from all activities (fishing, 
agriculture, and other sources of income) 
302.38 260.04 114 
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Table B―Determinants of Laboratory Behavior                                                                                                                
(OLS, Probit) 
          
       
Dependent Variable 
Cooperation in 
Public Good 
Experiment 
(OLS) 
Patience 
(Probit) 
Cooperation in 
Public Good 
Experiment 
(OLS) 
Cooperation in 
Public Good 
Experiment 
(OLS) 
Model 1 2 3 4 
Impatience Dummy 
(Praline) 
  -0.386 -0.583 
  (0.587) (0.530) 
Belief in PGE 0.619***   0.560*** 
(0.099)   (0.111) 
Preference for Praline  0.240  0.332 
 (0.384)  (1.358) 
Age -0.019 -0.003  -0.013 
(0.032) (0.008)  (0.044) 
Gender (Male 
Dummy) 
0.245 0.023  0.020 
(0.427) (0.146)  (0.616) 
Children -0.085 -0.010  -0.142 
(0.097) (0.035)  (0.156) 
Centrality -0.011 0.002  -0.010 
(0.007) (0.002)  (0.006) 
Years of Schooling 0.048 -0.023  0.105 
(0.115) (0.025)  (0.147) 
Years in Occupation 0.045* -0.002  0.065** 
(0.025) (0.007)  (0.028) 
Field Belief 
Shrimpers 
-0.428 0.032  -0.400 
(0.437) (0.107)  (0.559) 
Field Perception 
Shrimpers 
-0.221 0.065  -0.187 
(0.279) (0.073)  (0.289) 
Daily Hours Fishing -0.227 -0.005  -0.329** 
(0.139) (0.037)  (0.161) 
 Income 0.002** 0.000  0.002* 
(0.001) (0.000)  (0.001) 
Observations 112 83 83 83 
R2 0.400  0.005 0.381 
Pseudo R2  0.052   
 Notes: *** 99-percent significance, ** 95-percent significance; * 90-percent significance. Robust Standard Errors 
in Parentheses.  
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Table C―Robustness Check: Determinants of Size of Holes in 
Shrimp Traps (OLS)                                                                                               
Dependent Variable Average Size of Holes in Shrimp Trap in cm 
Model 1 2 3 
Contribution in PGE  (in MUs) 
0.0084**  0.0104
** 
(0.0035)  (0.0042) 
Impatience                          
(Praline Dummy) 
 0.0346
* 0.0381* 
 (0.0190) (0.0213) 
Did shrimper bring one bottle? 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
0.0216 0.0199 0.0193 
(0.0408) (0.0412) (0.038) 
Did trap collection take place in 
spring? (1=yes, 0=no) 
-0.1801 -0.1847 -0.1781 
(0.1106) (0.1913) (0.1143) 
Were five holes per trap 
measured? (1=yes, 0=no) 
-0.0829 -0.1016 -0.1406 
(0.1098) (0.1911) (0.1044) 
Belief in PGE   
0.0004 
  (0.0054) 
Preference for Praline                        
-0.0876 
  (0.0996) 
Age   
-0.0012 
  (0.0013) 
Gender (Male Dummy)   
0.048 
  (0.0333) 
Children   
0.0128** 
  (0.0062) 
Centrality   
-0.0004 
  (0.0004) 
Years of Schooling   
0.0001 
  (0.0045) 
Years in Occupation   
-0.0024** 
  (0.0011) 
Field Perception Shrimpers   
0.0587** 
  (0.0236) 
Field Belief Shrimpers   
-0.0256* 
  (0.0144) 
Daily Hours Fishing   
0.0039 
  (0.0065) 
Quantity of Shrimp Traps   
0.0000 
  (0.0000) 
Income   
-0.0001 
  (0.0000) 
Constant 
0.5275*** 0.5376*** 0.5028*** 
(0.1131) (0.1914) (0.1512) 
Village Fixed Effects? no no yes 
Observations 114 83 83 
R2 0.264 0.207 0.507 
 Notes: *** 99-percent significance, ** 95-percent significance; * 90-percent significance. Robust 
Standard Errors in Parentheses.  
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APPENDIX FIGURES 
Figure A: Shrimp Trap made from a PET bottle 
 
 
Note: Shrimp enter through big hole in front and can only  
escape through small holes at the bottom of the bottle. 
 
Figure B: One Fisherman's Fishnet 
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Figure C: Measuring the Fishnet Mesh Size 
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Appendix – Instructions  
 
Time Preference Experiment 
Before we start, here are two pralines. Please take a look at them. Do you like these pralines? 
Do you want these two pralines now or would you prefer waiting until the end of today’s 
meeting and receiving three pralines instead of two? 
 
Public Goods Experiment  
The outcome in this game depends on your decisions and the decisions of two others in this 
meeting. Note that you will never know who these two others are and these two others will 
never know that they played with you. You and the two others will have to make the same 
type of decision. Here are two envelopes. In one envelope, which we denote as your private 
envelope, are 10 points. These points are yours. The other, which is denoted the group 
envelope, is empty. You decide how many of the 10 points you transfer to the group envelope. 
What happens if you transfer points to the group envelope? First, of course, you will have 
fewer points in your private envelope. Second, for every point you transfer to the group 
envelope, we will add 0.5 points. Thus, if you transfer (for example) 10 points, we will add 5 
points and there will be 15 points in the group envelope. If you transfer nothing, we will not 
add points to the group envelope. What happens to the points in the group envelope? They 
will be equally distributed among all participants in your group including you. So, if there are 
15 points in the group envelope, you and the other two in your group get 5 points. You do not 
know how many points the others transfer to the group envelope. The other two participants 
in your group will also have to decide how many points they transfer to the group envelope 
before knowing the decisions of their group members.  
Let me give you an example. Imagine all three participants (including you) decide to transfer 
no points to the group envelope. Thus, there are no points in the group envelopes and all three 
participants stay with their 10 points in their private envelope. Imagine now all three 
participants including you decide to transfer all 10 points to the group account, i.e., there are 
Appendix 
 
30+0.5x30=45 points in the group envelopes. We will then divide the 45 points equally and 
each of you will receive 15 points. One last example: Imagine participant 1 gives 10 points to 
the group envelope, participant 2 gives 0 points to the group envelope und you give 5 points 
to the group envelope. We will then add 0.5 points for each point in the group envelopes, i.e. 
there are (10+0+5)×1.5=22.5 points. Then we divide these points equally among the three 
participants so that all get 7.5 points in addition to the points they kept in their private 
envelopes. So, participant 1 gets 0+7.5=7.5 points, participant 2  10+7.5=17.5 points and you 
5+7.5=12.5 points. Note that participant 2 received more points than you and participant 1 
because he did not transfer any point to the group envelope. In contrast, participant 1 received 
less because he transferred all 10 points to the group envelope.  
 Do you understand? While you make your decision, I will turn my back. Please do not 
tell me what you plan to do. Please decide now and transfer the amount of points you want 
from this envelope to the other and then put the two envelopes in the box in front of you. Tell 
me when you are ready!  
 
